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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a brave new age of  global connectivity and e-commerce, interconnections via 
networks have heightened, creating for both individuals and organizations, a state of complete 
dependence upon vulnerable systems for storage and transfer of  information. Never before, have 
so many people had power in their own hands. The power to deface websites, access personal 
mail accounts, and worse more the potential to bring down entire governments, and financial 
corporations through openly documented software codes. This paper discusses the possible 
exploits on typical network components, it will cite real life scenarios, and propose practical 
measures that can be taken as safeguard. Then, it describes some of the key efforts done by the 
research community to prevent such attacks, mainly by using Firewall and Intrusion Detection 
Systems.  
 
2. NETWORK SECURITY THREAT MODELS 
Network security refers to activities designed to protect a network. These activities ensure 
usability, reliability, and safety of a business network infrastructure and data. Effectual network 
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security focuses on a variety of threats and hinders them from penetrating or spreading into the 
network. Figure 1 shows some of the typical cyber attack models. 
The most common threats include: 
 Trojan horses and spyware (spy programs) 
 DOS (Denial of service attacks) 
 Data interception and theft 
 
Figure 1: Common Cyber Attack Models 
a. FLOODING 
In 1998, an American elite group, “The Digital Disturbance Theater” came up with Floodnet, an 
application set to halt the Mexican president’s webpage (for political reasons).  Floodnet is a java 
applet that automates the “refresh” button to click repeatedly. Sufficient users online would run 
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the application and hence cause the site’s server to continuously refresh until saturation and thus 
halt and disable the webpage. An attacker has used similar applications to take into hostage 
commercial websites in exchange for ransom. It is advisable for an organization to have for 
emergency, a savvy security expert (White-hat hacker); seeing that web technology is dynamic, 
with the ever changing trends in web scripting languages and browser configurations.  
 
b. KEYLOGERS 
These are simple software codes that exploit what we call ‘hooks’ on a computer’s kernel. Hooks 
capture vital hardware traffic like Keystrokes and mouse movements. Software based Key 
loggers are programmed to capture any button stroke you type on the keyboard and save words 
as a text file. That includes all private information you type like Passwords, Google searches, 
Credit card number, emails, to name but a few. Regularly updating of the Antivirus is a sure way 
to beat this. Let it also be known that Hardware key loggers exist, masquerading as flash disks. 
USB password applications should deter such. 
 
c. TROJANS 
An experienced programmer is capable of creating a Trojan, a concealed application that runs in 
the background. A Trojan allows a hacker to become a ghost user on your PC/Workstation. They 
monitor when your computer is online to deliver captured keystroke log files to their preferred 
address. Hackers can always come back and upload a malicious code via the Trojan. Such a code 
maybe the one that kills your antivirus program after which, it takes your snap via webcam or 
taps into your office conversations from your laptop microphone. Trojans come tucked away 
neatly on pirated software and the so-called cracks we all like to use. As the adage goes, it is 
difficult to cheat an honest person. The converse is true for those who would escape this pitfall. 
Let them invest in genuine software.  
 
d. BLUETOOTH 
Bluetooth is emerging as a versatile networking technology connecting workstations to printers, 
smart phones etc. I see potential for mischief; where data could be wirelessly intercepted for 
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malicious use. Such technology is currently non-existent, to the best of my knowledge, but 
nonetheless, a practical possibility. 
 
 
e. PHISING 
This is when emails appearing to come from well known organizations pop up on your browser, 
sending you links and requesting for private information like credit card numbers, account 
passwords or congratulating you for winning. Watch out for that nice email from a website you 
do not even have an account with.  
Look-alike websites are also not uncommon. They will have you login and ‘refill’ your personal 
details; after which they can make online purchases under your name or if they be diabolical 
enough, they will lock you out of your own account. (I lost my yahoo account that way). 
Numerous cyber security forums and workshops exist where one can always learn ways to have 
an edge over scammers and keep your business team informed 
 
f. RADIO JAMMING 
This can be a rare DOS (Denial of Service) technique to disrupt information flow in a wireless 
router network, accomplished by use of noise-generating radio devices. However, special 
Equipment exist, that can be used to track anonymous radio-noise sources, should interference be 
detected. 
 
g. WIRE SNIFFERS  
Attackers can always insert wire sniffing hardware at cable junctions. It should always be 
ensured that cable terminals and switch boards are always locked & access be granted only to 
authorized personnel. 
 
h. COMPROMISED SERVERS  
An exploited server is a server that is not entirely under your power. Someone else will have 
gained control of your server, using it for their own motives. Use of a Weak password is often 
one way a hacker will gain access to your server by guessing your password. People tend to use 
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simple passwords to keep them memorable. Such include dates, lover/pet names, office 
surrounding etc. Caution must therefore be exercised by combining letters with numerals to 
create a simple yet strong password. 
 
i. SERVER SECURITY HOLES 
Server Security can be compromised via security holes in a web application like addons/plugins 
such as joomla / wordpress. It is advisable to use only secure connections whenever possible. 
This includes the use of SSL connections for email, and SFTP (Secure File transfer Protocol) 
instead of the more common but unsecure FTP protocol.  
 
j. ZERO DAY/HOUR ATTACK 
Take this for example. The ‘sticky keys’ feature (sethc.exe) on your XP or Windows7 OS. It is a 
good accessibility feature that allows one to press special keys only once at a time. This 
application runs on the logon window when you press shift key five times even before you’ve 
entered your password. One only needs to rename the command prompt shell (cmd.exe) to 
sethc.exe on a logged-in computer. By this, they will have gained full control of your laptop or 
workspace computer anytime later without passing through any known account. How? By 
simply pressing the shit key five times and voila, the command prompt!  Try this for yourself 
(Hope they got that patched on Windows 8). 
Zero hour/day attacks take advantage software vulnerabilities that are yet to catch the eye of a 
software manufacturer. Should you discover such a bug, report to the software company for a 
patch to make up for the bug in later releases. Otherwise a hacker may discover the same 
loophole later, and use it maliciously. 
 
3. PROTECTION MODELS  
The research community investigated the cyber attack prevention models heavily. Most of 
the work was focused on preventing such attacks by automating Firewall rules and also 
improving Access Control Lists on network infrastructure devices. Alshaer et al. [3] identified 
all anomalies that could exist in a single- or multi-firewall environment. They also presented a 
set of algorithms to detect rule anomalies within a single firewall (intra-firewall anomalies), and 
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between inter-connected firewalls (inter-firewall anomalies) in the network. The authors also 
presented the Firewall Policy Advisor [22] which provides a number of techniques for purifying 
and protecting the firewall policy from rule anomalies. The administrator may use the firewall 
policy advisor to manage firewall policies without prior analysis of filtering rules. In this paper, 
they formally defined a number of firewall policy anomalies in both centralized and distributed 
firewalls and they proved that these are the only conflicts that could exist in firewall policies. 
Then they presented a set of algorithms to detect rule anomalies within a single firewall (intra-
firewall anomalies), and between inter-connected firewalls (inter-firewall anomalies) in the 
network. 
The authors in [4] analyzed the local consistency problem in firewall rule sets, with special 
focus on automatic frequent rule set updates. They also proposed a real time approach to detect 
inconsistencies in firewall rule sets when inserting, removing or modifying its rules. In [11], the 
authors approached the problem from a different angle and presented a highly scalable data 
structure that requires only O(n) space to map the dependencies among firewall policies. Then, 
they designed an algorithm to iterate over the data structure and detect and eliminate policy 
conflicts. This proved that the algorithm has an upper bound of O(n
2
 log n), making it the fastest 
to-date known algorithm for firewall rule anomaly discovery and resolution. They also ran 
experiments on real-life as well as synthetic firewall policies and showed that their algorithm 
achieved up to 87% improvement in the number of comparisons overhead, comparatively with 
the original policies. 
 FAME, Firewall Anomaly Management Environment, [5] is an innovative policy 
anomaly management framework that facilitates systematic detection and resolution of firewall 
policy anomalies. It also has a visualization-based firewall policy analysis tool that can used to 
design policies. In [6], the researchers designed and implemented a firewall analysis tool that 
allows the administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy (either a deployed 
policy or a planned one). Their tool uses a minimal description of the network topology, and 
directly parses the various vendor-specific low level configuration files. It interacts with the user 
through a query-and-answer session. 
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Alex Liu and his team [7] proposed a framework that can significantly reduce the number of 
rules in an access control list while maintaining the same semantics, and give an optimal 
algorithm for the one-dimensional range ACL compression problem, present a systematic 
solution for compressing multidimensional ACLs with mixed field constraints and conducted 
extensive experiments on both real-life and synthetic ACLs. Liu and his team also proposed a 
systematic approach, the TCAM Razor [21], that is effective, efficient, and practical. Systematic 
approach to minimizing TCAM rules for packet classifiers. While TCAM Razor does not always 
produce optimal packet classifiers, in their experiments with 40 structurally distinct real-life 
packet classifier groups, TCAM Razor achieves an average compression ratio of 31.3% and 
29.0%, respectively. Unlike other solutions that require modifying TCAM circuits or packet 
processing hardware, TCAM Razor can be deployed today by network administrators and ISPs 
to cope with range expansion. 
M. Gouda et al. [8] proposed a model of stateful firewalls, which is used to store some 
packets that the firewall has accepted previously and needs to remember in the near future. They 
designed a model of stateful firewalls that has several favorable properties. It allowed inheriting 
the rich results in stateless firewall design and analysis. Moreover, it provides backward 
compatibility such that a stateless firewall can also be specified using our model. Second, they 
presented methods for analyzing stateful firewalls that are specified using their model. 
Lujo Bauer et al. [9] showed how to eliminate a large percentage of misconfigurations in 
advance of attempted accesses using a data-mining technique called association rule mining. 
Their methods can reduce the number of accesses that would have incurred a costly time-of-
access delay by 43%, and can correctly predict 58% of the intended policy. 
B. Hari et al. [10] proposed a new scheme for conflict resolution, which is based on the idea 
of adding resolve filters. Their main results are algorithms for detecting and resolving conflicts 
in a filter database. They have tried their algorithm on 3 existing firewall databases, and have 
found conflicts, which are potential security holes, in each of them. A general solution is 
presented for the k -tuple filter, and an optimized version is described for the more common 2-
tuple filters consisting of source and destination addresses. They also showed how to use the 2-
tuple algorithm for the 5-tuple case in which the other three tuples have a restricted set of values.  
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 M. Waldvoge et al. [12] described an algorithm that contains both intellectual and 
practical contributions. On the intellectual side, after the basic notion of binary searching on hash 
tables, they found that they had to add markers and use precomputation, to ensure logarithmic 
time in the worst-case. Algorithms that only use binary search of hash tables are unlikely to 
provide logarithmic time in the worst case. They single out mutating binary trees as an 
aesthetically pleasing idea that leverages off the extra structure inherent in their particular form 
of binary search. On the practical side, they have a fast, scalable solution for IP lookups that can 
be implemented in either software or hardware. their software projections for IPv4 are 80 ns and 
they expect 150– 200 ns for IPv6. Our average case speed projections are based on the structure 
of existing routing databases that they examined. The overall performance can easily be 
restricted to that of the basic algorithm which already performs 
 The goal of the work in [13] was to design and implement a high performance, modular, 
extended integrated services router software architecture in the NetBSD operating system kernel. 
This architecture allows code modules, called plugins, to be dynamically added and configured 
at run time.  M. Al-Fares et al. [14] showed on their paper how to leverage largely commodity 
Ethernet switches to support the full aggregate bandwidth of clusters consisting of tens of 
thousands of elements. Similar to how clusters of commodity computers have largely replaced 
more specialized SMPs and MPPs, they argued that appropriately architected and interconnected 
commodity switches may deliver more performance at less cost than available from today’s 
higher-end solutions. Their approach requires no modifications to the end host network interface, 
operating system, or applications; critically, it is fully backward compatible with Ethernet, IP, 
and TCP. 
 M. Abedin et al. [15] presented an automated process for detecting and resolving such 
anomalies. The anomaly resolution algorithm and the merging algorithm should produce a 
compact yet anomaly free rule set that would be easier to understand and maintain. This 
algorithms can also be integrated into policy advisor and editing tools. They also established the 
complete definition and analysis of the relations between rules. 
H. Hu et al. [16] represented an innovative mechanism that facilitates systematic 
detection and resolution of XACML policy anomalies. A policy-based segmentation technique 
was introduced to achieve the goals of effective anomaly analysis. Also, described an 
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implementation of a policy anomaly analysis tool called XAnalyzer. The results showed that a 
policy designer could easily discover and resolve anomalies in an XACML policy with the help 
of XAnalyzer.   
 D. A. Applegate et al. [20] considered a geometric model for the problem of minimizing 
access control lists (ACLs) in network routers. Their goal was to create a colored rectilinear 
pattern within an initially white rectangular canvas, and the basic operation is to choose a 
subrectangle and paint it a single color, overwriting all previous colors in the rectangle. 
Rectangle Rule List (RRL) minimization is the problem of finding the shortest list of rules 
needed to create a given pattern. They provide several equivalent characterizations of the 
patterns achievable using strip-rules and present polynomial-time algorithms for optimally 
constructing such patterns when, as in the ACL application, the only colors are black and white 
(permit or deny). They also showed that RRL minimization is NP-hard in general and provide 
O(min(n1=3;OPT1=2))- approximation algorithms for general RRL and ACL minimization by 
exploiting our results about strip-rule patterns. This work was very substantial but it didn’t 
address, however, the integrity of router’s Access Control Lists. Consequently, Ahmat and 
Elnour [17] investigated the integrity of routers’ ACLs in large enterprise networks. More 
specifically, they studied the problem of discovering and eliminating redundant ACLs from 
multiple routers’ configurations and described efficient methods for removing such 
redundancies. They also implemented the algorithms they proposed and validated their 
practicality showing that their approach can discover potential security holes in complex network 
infrastructures. 
Y. Bartal et al. [18] presented an initial design and implementation of a prototype for a 
new generation of firewall and security management tools that showed its usefulness on a real 
world example, demonstrating that the task of firewall and security configuration/management 
can be done successfully at a level of abstraction analogous to modern programming languages, 
rather than assembly code; as an important first step towards the convergence of security and 
network management. Later, M. Gritter et al. [19] described a content routing design based on 
name-based routing as part of an explicit Internet content layer. The content routing is a natural 
extension of current Internet directory and routing systems, allows efficient content location, and 
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can be implemented to scale with the Internet. Their results indicate that client name lookup is 
then faster and far less variable.   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a dedicated network security organ is vital for protecting infrastructures. If you 
have good network security, your company or organization is protected against interruption, 
employees remain productive. Network security helps you meet compulsory regulatory 
compliance. Protecting your client's data means no lawsuits emanating from cases about data 
theft.  
Components of the dedicated security organ include: 
 A constantly updated Anti-virus software. 
 A Firewall, that blocks unauthorized access to workstation PCs (USB ports, LAN, WIFI). 
 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), to give secure remote admission. 
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